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Impactof Phase IV and V Regimes
on Growth
PartsII and III address the question: What determines whether a devaluation
is quickly followed by a return to a Phase I or II regime or, at least for a period
of time, will Phases IV and V follow? It was seen that a number of factors in-
fluence the likelihood of moving to Phases IV and V, and that there are better
and worse devaluation packages in this regard. Under all circumstances,
however, there are bound to be costs associated with devaluation, as is true of
any change in economic policy. The costs have already been investigated and,
in addition to once-and-for-all costs of dislocation, there are costs centering on
the output loss associated with measures taken to free resources and liberalize
the regime for a period of time before a sustained response of foreign-
exchange earnings can occur. There is a trade-off between: (1) resorting to
foreign credits for financing additional imports; and (2) allowing domestic
recession to reduce domestic demand for imports. Foreign borrowing is
generally the better choice, but it too has a cost in that it represents a claim
against future income; it can be defended only if output is higher later on than
it would otherwise have been.
In this part, attention is on the benefits that can accrue to countries that
devalue their currencies and succeed in attaining a sustained period of bias
reduction and liberalization. For purposes of analysis, itis convenient to
regard the benefits resulting from achieving Phases IV and V as being the sum
of three parts: (1) the avoidance of costs that would have resulted because the
restrictiveness of the regime would otherwise have had to increase; (2) the dif-
ferential in the growth rate resulting from higher export earnings when the ex-
change rate is more realistic; and (3) the effect on growth and resource alloca-
tion of the shift in the bias of the regime.
The costs of QR regimes are analyzed in detail by Bhagwati in his compa-
246





and the export resp
siderable extent, to





term. Success is de
in Chapter 9. There
the effects on grow
reduction. First, th
be evaluated to see
perience with Phasi









ment is more, prodi
be a higher
phasized that focus








and IV the greate
wasteful allocationjimes
Lethera devaluation
at least for a period
imber of factors in-
that there are better
all circumstances,
uation, as is true of
en investigated and,
e costs centering on
urces and liberalize
sponse of foreign-
en: (1) resorting to
)allowingdomestic
reign borrowing is
t represents a claim
higher later on than
ue to countries that
med period of bias
itis convenient to
V as being the sum
resulted because the
icrease; (2) the dif-
rnings when the ex-
nd resource alloca-
gwati in his compa-
MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS 247
nion volume. In general they center on the inefficiencies involved in licensing
and the resource misallocation emanating from high variance in implicit
EERs. Those costs are not discussed further here, and the reader should refer
to Bhagwati.
The second category of benefits—the effects of a higher real export EER
and the export response to it—seems amenable to identification and, to a con-
siderable extent, to quantification. That is the topic of this chapter. The results
of a sustained shift in bias toward export promotion are the subject of
Chapter 12.
This chapter focuses on the growth effects experienced by all countries
during periods when they were in Phases IV and V, including the effects that
follow simply from success in achieving Phases IV and V in the intermediate
term. Success is defined in terms of the categorization of export performance
in Chapter 9. There are two basic approaches that can be employed to identify
the effects on growth of intermediate-term success with liberalization and bias
reduction. First, the conclusions and impressions of the country authors can
be evaluated to see what features seem common to the various countries' ex-
perience with Phases IV and V. Second, the parameters that affect the growth
rate can be investigated statistically to find whether they are significantly
altered by changes in export performance and whether they are significantly
different in Phases IV and V from what they are in Phases I and II. Both of
these approaches are employed in this chapter.
A number of hypotheses with respect to the microeconomic effects of bias
reduction and liberalization are examined in light of the evidence from the
country studies. They relate to the effects on such phenomena as the degree of
capacity utilization, employment, factor substitution, and income distribu-
tion. Thereafter, some macroeconomic hypotheses are examined—that invest-
ment is more, productive, that GNP grows more rapidly, that investment will
be a higher fraction of GNP, and that savings are affected. It should be em-
phasized that focus here is on the effects of a more realistic real exchange rate
for exports and of liberalization, even when import substitution remains the
dominant strategy. Concern therefore is with the effects on countries such as
Turkey, Chile, and the Philippines. In Chapter 12 the additional effects of an
export-oriented strategy are examined.
I. MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS
Microeconomic hypotheses concerning the effects of bias reduction and
liberalization on growth are numerous, but many are stated in a form that can-
not be directly tested. An important one, for example, is that under Phase IV
and IV the greater uniformity in incentives among industries implies less
wasteful allocation of resources (including, of course, the direction of new in-248 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
vestment); that, in turn,implies that the growth rate will be higher, ceteris
paribus. Variance isreducedin Phases IV and V, but it is not obvious that it is
reduced variance—rather than other changes which accompany Phase
111—that affects growth. The hypothesis cannot be distinguished from others
that attempt to associate a specific change resulting from Phase III with
altered growth performance. Although the growth rate in Phases IV and V
may be differentiated from that in Phases I and II, this does not really
distinguish between the separate contributions of bias reduction, liberaliza-
tion, rationalization, and altered variance which result from devaluation and
related policy measures.
This section identifies the key parameters believed to be significantly af-
fected by the nature of the trade and payments regime. It is possible from this
to gain at least some impression of the impact of the regime on the variable in
question. Differences in growth rates are tested in the second section of this
chapter. To the extent that export-oriented growth strategies succeed in im-
proving growth performance above and beyond the amount predicted by the
estimates developed, it may well be that reduced variance (and rationalization
of the regime) is an important explanatory variable.
Factor Markets
Many of the hypotheses pertaining to the microeconomic effects of alternative
trade and payments regime relate to the impact of those regimes on factor
markets. Among those hyoptheses are: (1) a higher degree of capacity utiliza-
tion usually accompanies Phases IV and V; (2) techniques tend to be more
labor intensive in Phases IV and V; (3) Phase IV and V regimes encourage a
mix of industriesthat generates more employment opportunities; and
(4) liberalized trade regimes result in increased competition for domestic
firms, leading to more rapid growth of total factor productivity.
There are close interrelations among the various hypotheses, and each
hypothesis raises a broad range of issues over and above those relating to trade
and payments regimes. For example, hypotheses 2 and 3 would, if valid, imply
a more rapid growth of employment under Phases IV and V, ceteris paribus.
That is both because techniques would presumably become more labor inten-
sive in each industry andbecausethe industry mix would alter. However,
many other aspects of factor markets would have to be investigated in order to
evaluate the total employment impact; in particular, the mechanism of wage
rate determination could, in some instances, offset a substantial portion of the
increased demand for labor that is implied by these two hypotheses.2
For purposes of analyzing the effects on growth of alternative trade and
payments regimes, it is necessary to limit the questions to the range of issues
covered by the individual country studies. These results can be regarded, in a
sense, as "partial eq
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sense,as "partial equilibrium" estimates of the effects of the trade regimes on
factor markets. They can be interpreted as the total effect only if it is assumed
that there are no other factors in the system that would offset any direct effects
the regime might otherwise have.
CAPACITY UTILIZATION
There are two main ways in which the transition from Phase II to Phase
IV might affect the level of capacity utilization. Both relate to the presumed
detrimental effects of the QR regime on capacity utilization, which the transi-
tion to Phases IV and V would be expected to remove. One way is that the
removal of exchange control regimes ends incentives to build excess capacity
that results from use of capacity as a criterion for import licensing. When
allocation of licenses for intermediate goods is based on the criterion of ex-
isting capacity, and premiums accrue to those who receive import licenses for
the intermediate goods, there is bound to be an incentive to try to obtain addi-
tional capacity.3 For that reason, as demonstrated in some of the country
studies, firms may deliberately build capacity they do not expect they will be
able to utilize fully. A second way is that removal of exchange controls ends
the problem that firms dependent on imported intermediate inputs find their
production levels constrained by their inability to obtain the necessary inputs.
Thus, existing capacity, which might initially have been utilized, can be idled if
imports are cut back during the course of Phase II.
Both of these hypotheses imply that one ought to observe lower levels of
idle capacity during Phases IV and V than during I and II, although the precise
reasons differ. In the first situation, one would not expect transition to Phase
IV necessarily to result immediately in increased utilization of existing capaci-
ty, but rather that chronic excess capacity would gradually be reduced.4 In the
second situation an increased flow of imports might result in an immediate in-
crease in output levels and thus reduce the degree of underutilization of capaci-
ty as soon as imports started flowing.
There is one consideration that suggests capacity might be overutilized
under exchange controls, however. Firms might wish to expand capacity dur-
ing Phase II but be unable to obtain needed capital goods imports. In such a
case, actual capacity might be below desired capacity, and capacity utilization
rates would be uneconomically high. After transition to Phases IV and V, im-
ports of capital goods would increase, and utilization rates might fall as
capacity expanded.
A further point should be noted: many times the authorities are aware of
the incentives the regime creates and try to take steps to regulate the undesired
response to those incentives. For example, although the government of India
provided strong incentives for excess capacity creation, there was a partial off-
set because capital goods import licenses were required. They were supposed to
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be granted only when there was no excess capacity in the industry. However,
the authorities also wanted to be equitable; given a limitation on capital goods
imports, they were often confronted with situations in which equal treatment
of the license applications of the large number of applicants meant that all
plants would be well below economic size, yet equity considerations dictated
licensing more smaller plants rather than fewer ones of a more economic size.
Thereafter it was difficult to refuse permission to expand. Also, firms tended
to build their initial capacity in ways enabling them later to claim that only
some "balancing equipment" was necessary for expansion and that it could be
obtained at a very low marginal cost. Thus, the authorities' efforts to contain
construction of excess capacity were, at best, only partially successful.
In addition to the attempt on the part of government to avoid the creation
of excess capacity, there are other mechanisms that offset some of the adverse
effect of QRs on capacity use. Individual firms, conscious of the profit oppor-
tunities if they can expand production (while other firms are constrained),
devote resources to avoiding bottlenecks. By appropriate stocking of inven-
tories, resort to the black market, and other measures, some of the idle capaci-
ty that might otherwise result from licensing is avoided. Of course this entails
costs to firms, and thus the effects of dismantling the QR regime may be felt in
increased efficiency in the use of other noncapital inputs, rather than in higher
capacity utilization.
There is therefore nothing that implies that the QR regime's effects would
all be in one direction. Indeed, one might observe some sectors that had excess
capacity during Phase II increasing utilization in Phase IV, while other sectors,
unable to expand capacity during Phase II, might expand it when imports are
liberalized and thus reduce their utilization rate to a more economic level. In-
deed, both phenomena were reported in the country studies.
In Turkey before devaluation in 1958 and in Ghana prior to 1967, current
production levels seem to have been seriously cut back during Phase II because
of reduced imports of intermediate goods—the second type of capacity
underutilization. Both countries experienced relatively severe across-the-board
output reductions because imports were insufficient to maintain the level of
economic activity. In the Turkish case there was not yet a large manufacturing
sector dependent upon imported materials, but the supply of many com-
modities was provided almost entirely by imports. When gasoline imports
ceased, for example, tractors were unable to continue with the harvest and
truck transportation became severely underutilized; construction projects lay
partially completed for lack of additional imports. In Ghana the production
impact was likewise across-the-board, but there was a larger import-
substitution sector. Leith describes curtailment of production resulting from
shortages of spare parts and raw materials in the 1964-1966 period. The
available data suggest that, in 1964, manufacturing capacity utilization was 60
percent of single-shift capacity, and apparently underutilization increased fur-
ther in the following two years.5
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Other countries also experienced disruptions of production due to import
shortages in the predevaluation period, although they were notsevere as
those in Ghana and Turkey. It seems evident that if a flow of intermediate
goods is abruptly and sharply reduced, there will be some resulting reduction
in the rate of capacity utilization. If the flow of imports increases following
devaluation, there can be a once-and-for-all increase in the level of industrial
production and economic activity when these bottlenecks are removed.
The other type of excess capacity—chronic sectoral underutilization—was
apparently present in a significant number of Phase LI regimes, including
Chile, Colombia, Israel until 1952-1955, India, the Philippines, and—to a
lesser extent—Turkey in the 1960s. In those countries, capacity in the modern
import-substitution manufacturing sector was chronically underutilized. This
underutilization persisted over a substantial time period and was not simply
associated with the last part of Phase II. It was, rather, a consequence of the
bias of the regime.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan show average rates of underutilization of capaci-
ty in India for 1961-64 more than 40 percent: capacity in the leather and rubber
products industry was 57 percent underutilized; chemicals and chemical pro-
ducts, 56 percent; metal products, 54 percent; electrical machinery, 43 percent;
and transport equipment, 42 percent.6 These sectors were the focal point of the
import-substitution drive during that period. Baldwin found underutilization
rates of more than 50 percent in twenty out of thirty-one Philippine industries
in 1970, and he noted that the phenomenon appears to have startedin the late
1950s.1 In Egypt, capacity utilization in the auto industry was very low due to
shortages of imported parts and components.8 In contrast, capacity utilization
in the Egyptian textile industry was uneconomically high due to a shortage of
machinery.9 QR regimes can evidently result in both excess capacity and
capacity shortfall.
In Turkey there was some evidence that a few heavily import-dependent
industries may have been constrained in their capacity utilization levels, but
there was no indication of any systematic trend toward underutilization. What
there was appears to have been concentrated in industries with very high
domestic resource costs. In this regard it is important to note that idle capacity
is not always economically undesirable, but if it is chronic it is presumptive
evidence of earlier wasted investment.
In most of these instances it was the bias of the regime that led to the
establishment of the import-substitution industries. That excess capacity was
chronic in these industries is apparent from the fact that the situation did not
significantly improve with devaluation. In India there was some capacity ab-
sorption after 1966, but it was only partial and came about because some
import-substitution firms were provided with incentives sufficient to enable
them to export. In Chile, Ghana, and the Philippines, it is not apparent that
excess capacity was significantly reduced after devaluation.
The only cases in which the country authors appeared to believe that the252 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
sectoral excess capacity that developed during the QR period was ended with
Phase IV are Israel and Colombia. Michaely reported that accounts of
underutilization of capacity were widespread throughout the QR years and
that this phenomenon disappeared after about 1955.10 He was, however,
unable to find a direct measure to test the extent to which liberalization of the
regime was itself responsible for the change. He therefore investigated the
change in total factor productivity after liberalization and found a significant
difference in its rate of growth between Phases II and IV. That evidence,
however, covers the total change between a QR and a liberalized regime and
cannot be taken as evidence of the effect of altered capacity utilization rates
alone.'
In the Colombian Case, Diaz reported a significant reduction in idle
capacity after Colombia's move to Phase IV in 1967, but he found the reason
for it to be different from that in the other countries. He attributed the change
to the altered trade and payments regime but thought that excess capacity in
Phase II resulted from low levels of domestic demand. In his judgment, much
of Colombia's preexisting excess capacity had come about because of Colom-
bia's use of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies in Phase II to contain the
demand for imports. Those policies also cut back demand for domestically
produced goods. After 1967, Diaz believes, monetary and fiscal policy were
used for internal balance, thus permitting fuller capacity utilization than had
occurred in Phase I1.12
Overall, then, it would appear that the tendency toward underutilization
of capacity in Phase II is more prevalent than uneconomically high utilization
rates. There is little doubt that, in a few countries, production was temporarily
below desired levels in predevaluation periods. For a large number of countries
caught in Phase II regimes, there appears to have been chronic excess capacity,
but devaluation and liberalization efforts did little to increase utilization rates.
That was either because domestic demand was inadequate to warrant higher
production levels or because the large foreign exchange expenditures required
to satisfy it—as in the case of Egyptian autos—would have been inconsistent
with the government's objectives. The fact that excess capacity was generally
greatest in import-substitution industries strongly suggests that it is the bias of
the regime toward import substitution that accounts for the phenomenon; as
in the Indian case, however, the nature of the licensing system itself gave rise
to additional incentives to overbuild capacity.
FACTOR PROPORTIONS
There are a number of reasons why the price of imported capital goods
relative to labor and domestic capital goods tends to be lower in Phase I and II
than in Phase IV and V. It is widely thought that the relative cheapness of im-
ported capital goods induces firms that are able to get import licenses to
choose more capital
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choose more capital-intensive techniques in Phase II than they do in Phases IV
and V. That phenomenon would imply that the incremental capital output
ratio would be higher in Phases I and II than in IV and V. An offsetting
tendency, of course, might occur when firms wanting to expand were unable to
import capital goods.
The factors tending to make the price of imported capital goods relatively
low in Phase II are well understood. As Phase II regimes become increasingly
selective, policymakers are reluctant to impose duties or surcharges on the im-
portation of capital goods for fear that they will lower the investment rate.
One aspect of the variance in EERs in Phase II arises from this discriminatory
treatment in favor of imports of investment goods. Its result is that those en-
trepreneurs who can get permission to expand their plants or to build new fac-
tories have an incentive to substitute relatively cheap imported capital goods
for labor and domestically produced capital goods.
The evidence in the country studies does not provide any basis for believ-
ing that substitution between domestic and imported capital goods is signifi-
cant.'3 It would appear that the important effects of alternative trade regimes
on factor use are felt primarily through: (1) the impact of the relatively cheap
price of imports of capital goods on the capital-labor ratio; and (2) the choice
of industries. This latter is reflected in the capital intensity of expanding in-
dustries and is therefore discussed below under employment.
There are two questions related to the first effect—capital/labor substitu-
tion: (I) To what extent is capital relatively cheaper in Phase H than in Phases
IV and V? (2) To what extent does substitution of capital for labor alter the
capital/labor ratio in each industry?
Table 11-1 gives the estimates of the PLD-EERs for imports of capital
goods for the countries for which time series are presented in the country
studies. In Turkey, the Philippines, and Colombia, there was a pronounced
tendency for the real prices of imported capital goods to increase after Phase
III and to decline during Phase II episodes. The Turkish devaluation of 1958
resulted in a virtual doubling of the real price of capital goods; if data were
available for the period following the 1970 Phase III episode, the same
phenomenon would appear, although the percentage increase would be
smaller. The Philippines' 1960-1962 episode prompted an increase from 1.91
to 3.25 1955 pesos per dollar for imported capital goods, and a 25 percent in-
crease was again recorded with the Phase III of 1970. For Colombia the rise in
the real price of imported capital equipment was dramatic in 1957/58, but it
was also significant for 1965 and 1967. The Chilean data show something of
the same phenomenon, although the magnitude of change is smaller; the real
price of imported capital goods increased after the 1956 and 1959 Phase III
episodes, but it did not do so in 1965. In Israel there appears to have been the
same general experience until the devaluation of 1962: the real price of im-254 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
Table 11-1.Indicators of Imported Capital Goods, Prices, Five Countries,
1954-1971 (index of PLD-EERs for capital goods, 1958 = 100)
Year Chile Colombia Israel Philippines Turkey
1954 99 51 n.a. 98 51
1955 86 53 125 102 53
1956 87 52 113 102 • 51
1957 101 71 107 100 57
1958 100 100 100 100 100
1959 105 92 101 98 97
1960 93 88 97 97 82
1961 93 82 93 •129 84
1962 89 84 138 146 80
1963 • 93 85 127 150 78
1964 97 74 121 144 81
1965 91 81 113 144 91
1966 93 91 104 141 85
1967 85 99 105 135 80
1968 83 110 112 135 60
1969 76 106 .114 139 59
1970 n.a. n.a. 110 •183 n.a.
1971 n.a. n.a. 126 177 na.
Note: Data for the years in which devaluation took place are in italics. Comparison of real rates
cannot be made between countries; only changes in level within countries are meaningful.
Sources: Chile—Berhman,. Table A-8, PLD-EER for investment goods; Colombia—Index of
price of imported capital goods, provided by deflated by the wholesale price index;
Israel—EERforinvestment goodsfromTable4-12deflatedbythe GNP deflator;
Philippines—Table5-3, PPP-PLD-EER foressential producer goods, new and necessary
industries; Turkey—PLD-EER for capital goods imports from Tables 11-3, 111-3, VI-lO.
ported capital goods was declining continuously from 1955 to 1961, and again
after 1962 until 1966. After that time the tendency for the relative price of im-
ported capital goods to fall between devaluations seems to have been offset by
compensating adjustments to maintain the real rate.
Although systematic data are not available for other countries, the same
general tendency appears to have been fairly widespread. Leith, for example,
reports that in Ghana favored sectors were given access to cheap imported
capital goods.'4 Fishlow's estimates indicate that in Brazil subsidies to invest-
ment in the industrial sector were equal to 19.1 percent of income originating
in manufacturing in 1959.
Evidence on the real wage is far less uniform. As already reported, real
wages in manufacturing fell about 20 percent in°Brazil in the 1964-1968 period.
Behrman found that Chilean devaluations tended to reduce real wages but that
increased flows of imports tended to increase real wages." Part of the
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reason for the positive effect of liberalization is that Chile imports many con-
sumer goods; when imports of these commodities increase,their price
falls—or at least fails to rise as fast as it otherwise would—and that tends to
raise the real wage. In Colombia the real wage appears to have remained ap-
proximately constant in 1957/58, compared with rapid increases in earlier and
later years. Its rise does not appear to have been affected by the 1962 devalua-
tion, and after 1965 the real wage was relatively constant through 1969, the last
year for which Diaz provided data.'7
Ghanaian real wages in manufacturing appear to have fallen from
1961—the first year for which data are available—until 1965, when they were
23 percent below their 1961 level. Therefore, they were falling throughout
Phases I and II, but they rose in each of the following three years by an
average of about 5 percent, leaving real wages still 9 percent below their 1961
level in In South Korea, monthly earnings of production workers in
manufacturing deflated by the Seoul consumer price index reached a peak of
8,900 won (in 1970 prices) in 1959 and then fell to a low of 7,540 won in 1964.
Thereafter they rose rapidly, exceeding their 1959 level by 1967 and reaching
14,561 won in 1970. It would thus appear that in the years when the shift
toward export promotion was starting, real wages were falling. After 1964,
however, real wages were rising rapidly.'9 In the Philippines there was a similar
decline in real wages from 1959 to 1965. Indeed, for unskilled workers it was
not until 1969 that the 1955 real wage level was reattained. In the case of the
Philippines, however, the declining real wage appears to have represented
something of a long-term trend and does not seem to have been associated with
changes in the phases of the trade and payments regime.2°
Theory of course predicts that it is neither the real wage nor the real price
of capital alone that determines factor proportions—it is the mix of the two.
For the countries where the ratio is available, there is fairly striking evidence
that the ratio of the wage to the price of capital goods alters significantly, with
the relative price of labor falling, from Phases I and II to Phases IV and V.
Data provided by Diaz indicate that the ratio of wages to prices of imported
capital goods fell from 2.30 in 1956 to 1.25 in 1958, reached 2.40 again in 1964,
and began falling after that, reaching 1.73 by 1969. For Ghana, Roemer
estimates that between 1966 and 1967 the wage/rental ratio fell about 25 per-
cent. By 1969 half of the decrease had already been offset by rising costs of
labor and falling prices of capital goods.2 The Turkish wage/rental ratio also
fluctuated with the state of the trade and payments regime; it was 2.15 in 1955,
fell to 1.72 in 1960, and rose continuously thereafter until 1970. This came
about both because of rising wage rates and because of implicit subsidization
of capital goods imports.
There thus seems to be a reasonable uniformity of experience with relative
changes in the prices of labor and capital goods during the phases. The ques-
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employment. Evidence of substitution of capital for labor was reported in the
Chilean, Ghanaian, and Turkish studies.
Behrman's estimates of sectoral elasticities of substitution between labor
and capital are all significantly nonzero for Chile. Behrman concludes that the
foreign trade regime provided important incentives to substitute capital for
labor. In mining, for example, the estimated elasticity of substitution was
0.51. Behrman used that and his other results to calculate the employment im-
pact. He concluded:
The long-run demand for labor in large-scale mining would have been 44 per-
cent larger had exchange-rate discrimination not affected the dollar cost of
labor.... Withthe option ofincreasingoutput, the demand for labor would
have been even greater. Such calculations should not be taken literally, but they
do suggest that the employment effects of the discriminatory NER policy may
have been quite considerable.22
Leith estimated production functions for a sample of Ghanaian industries
and found them to have elasticites of substitution not significantly different
from unity. He was unable, however, to quantify precisely the nature of im-
plicit and explicit subsidies to the use of imported capital goods:
If these magnitudes are anywhere nearly representative of the Ghanaian situation,
we now have a major clue explaining the response of the industrial sector to the
control regime. Cheap and virtually unlimited supplies of foreign exchange and
capital for the favored ones stimulated output, but the use of imported materials
accelerated and the output/capital ratio plummeted. .
Thegrowth consequences of the set of policies which permitted large relative
on capital and imported materials were serious. Favored sectors
flourished. Other sectors suffered seriously: access to capital and foreign ex-
change was, for most, blocked and little or no growth occurred. The overall effect
was one of stagnation accompanied. by apparently worse capital and foreign ex-
change "gaps" for the economy as a whole.23
For Turkey the evidence suggested that techniques were more capital in-
tensive than they would have been had prices of capital goods been higher
relative to the price of labor. While it appeared that substitution in the main
production processes was occasionally possible, the important possibilities for
substitution of capital for labor lay in the areas of moving goods through the
plant, packaging, and other peripheral processes. In addition there was an in-
teresting example of the way subsidies to capital can be misused. In the early
1950s, large tractor imports, which were sold cheaply, were permitted.
Peasants in the Anatolean plateau were thereby induced to convert their land
from forests and pastures to cropland. It is estimated that the total value of
agricultural output fell, if international prices are used and the change in the
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livestock herd is valued appropriately. For several years, however, large in-
creases in wheat production obscured the underlying reduction in the produc-
tive capacity of the Anatolean plateau's agricultural sector.24
EMPLOYMENT
The net impact of the trade and payments regime on employment can be
regarded as the result of the factor substitution induced by the regime, changes
in the mix of outputs, and also any differences in the overall rate of growth of
output. All of these factors proved to have important effects on employment
in the countries covered by the project. While there appeared to be con-
siderable differences in the relative importance of each factor, the evidence
from the country studies provides a great deal of support for the view that
employment growth is more rapid under Phase IV and V regimes.
Baldwin found that employment increased verylittleinPhilippine
manufacturing. He attributed most of the sluggish performance to increased
capital intensity resulting from the bias of the regime:
•.. Between1950 and 1959 both the output-capital and output-labor ratios rose.
However, the latter ratio increased consIderably faster than the former, with the
result that the capital-labor ratio rose 74 percent between these years. After 1959
the output-labor ratio continued to rise, although much less rapidly, but the
output-capital ratio fell. Thus, both of these changes operated to increase the
capital-labor ratio. Since by 1968 the output-capital ratio had declined to its 1950
level, the more than doubling of the capital-labor ratio in manufacturing between
these years can be attributed entirely to the increase in the output labor ratio,
i.e., to the failure of employment in manufacturing to rise cOmmensurately with
production.25
Baldwin further found that only a small part of the increase in the
capital/labor ratio was due to changes in the composition of the industrializa-
tion program (at least through 1960) and noted that "the use of capital-
intensive methods of production was also...encouragedin any given in-
dustry."26
Similar results were found for. Turkey, with evidence based upon the ex-
isting factor proportions in each industry. The demand for factors of produc-
tion that would have resulted—given initial-period, industry-specific factor
proportions—from the manufacturing output increases programmed under
each plan was compared with the factor utilization that would have resulted
from a more "neutral" expansion. Two alternative "neutral" paths were
assumed: in one, all manufacturing industries would have expanded in propor-
tion to their initial output levels; in the other, each industry's allocation of new
investment was in proportion to its initial capital assets. The latter path would
have enabled import substitution to continue (partly by maintaining ther
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assumed rate of investment in all of the manufacturing industries) but at a rate
less rapid than in fact occurred. The results indicated that capital goods im-
ports could have been reduced by 24 and 12 percent, respectively, in the first
two plans, with newly created jobs rising from 197,000 to 335,000inthe first
plan period and from 428,000 to 640,000 in the second plan period, under the
hypothetical expansion-in-proportion-to-output strategy. There thus seemed
little doubt that industry-mix changes could have resulted in significant dif-
ferences in the manufacturing capital/output and labor/output ratios.27
South Korea's employment growth was remarkably rapid. Frank, Kim,
and Westphal attributed this both to appropriate factor prices and to industry
mix:
Growth in employment opportunities in manufacturing was rapid mainly because
of large increases in investment and output which created a demand for workers.
The growth in output was achieved through labor-intensive methods. In many
other countries rapid growth in manufacturing output is accompanied by a rapid
increase in labor productivity because of a trend toward more capital-intensive
methods. In Korea, by contrast, manufacturing employment grew very rapidly
between 1957 and 1967, at 9.6 per cent per annum, while labor productivity lag-
ged behind at an average annual rate of increase of about 2.6 per cent.
Even though manufacturing employment grew less rapidly after 1967, the
rate of growth from 1957 to 1972 averaged 8.8 per cent per annum. Meanwhile,
total nonagricultural employment increased by 7.3 per cent per annum. One
reason for this good performance was the government'swillingness to allow wage
rates to be set by competitive forces. ... Furthermore,by permitting the South
Korean price structure to remain largely consistent with world prices, the govern-
ment provided incentives to concentrate production in labor-intensive exports
and home goods and to import capital-intensive goods rather than to substitute
for imports. Labor absorption was very rapid, at least until the very late 1960s
when labor shortages began to appear and wages started to rise very rapidly.2'
Diaz was hampered by a lack of data for Colombia in his analysis of
employment under alternative trade regimes. He concluded that the Phase IV
regime after 1967 increased urban employment opportunties simply as a func-
tion of more rapid growth of output. The impact on rural employment was
more questionable; different agricutural activities have different labor-land re-
quirements, and which commodities are exported is a function of the available
land resources, as well as of labor supply and other variables. 29
In addition D(az pointed to another consideration that may be of impor-
tance: there can be a significant difference between the factor intensity of ex-
ports in the period immediately following devaluation and the longer-run fac-
tor intensity of exports. This is particularly the case if import-substitution
firms with excess capacity before devaluation are able to export in the
postdevaluation period; they may well be firms employing capital-intensive
techniques, and the net short-run impact on employment may be small. In the
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longer run it is possible that the firms basing their capacity expansion on ex-
port prospects are those with factor requirements more nearly approximating
those predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model.30 This tends once again to rein-
force the notion put forth in Chapter 9 that the intermediate-term export
response can be quite different in nature from the longer-term results when
bias of the regime is shifted significantly away from import substitution and
toward exports.
COMPETITION
An additional hypothesis about the determinants of factor productivity
suggests that the efficiency with which all factors are employed improves with
liberalization of the trade and payments regime. The argument is that, in tight
exchange control situations,the authorities inevitably tend to conserve
"scarce" foreign exchange by prohibiting the importation of goods available
from domestic sources. This provides protected markets for domestic pro-
ducers. In the absence of competition from abroad, there is only a weak
mechanism to drive inefficient firms out of business (or to increase their effi-
ciency) and overall factor productivity will tend to be lower.
The only possible test of this hypothesis would be an examination of the
behavior of total factor productivity in Phase II relative to that in liberalized
trade and payments regimes. Michaely evaluated the behavior of total factor
productivity growth in the Israeli economy, excluding the housing and public
sectors (for which such data are not meaningful), and for the manufacturing
sector alone:
The impression gained is indeed in conformity with the postulated effect of
QRs; namely, the rate of increase of productivity rose markedly from 1951-52,
the period of rapid transition to the price mechanism as a means of regulating im-
ports as well as other activities in the economy. ...Itshould be recalled,
moreover, that in the transitional period, 1953-5 5, the level of imports evidenced
only a slight rise; in fact, there was a rather substantial decline in the ratio of im-
ports to output. The rapid increase in productivity in those years thus cannotbe
explained by the removal of bottlenecks through an increased supply of
imports..
.
Bhagwatiand Srinivasan attempted to deal with the same hypothesis us-
ing Indian data, but unfortunately their estimates cover only the period up to
1964 and therefore cannot be used to test the effects of liberalization,
which—insofar as it happened—took place after 1966. Even if their data series
could be extended, it would be difficult to reach a firm conclusion as to what
happened to Indian productivity; estimates for the period up to 1964 range
from a decline at an annual rate of—l.6 percent to an increase at an annual
rate of 2.8 percent.32
Other country authors mentioned increased competition from interna-Goods Markets
It was seen in Chapter 9 that a more rapid export growth rate is associated with
the higher export real EER that tends to accompany Phases IV and V. The
resource pulls between import-substitution and export-oriented industries are
undoubtedly the most important phenomenon distinguishing Phases I and II
from Phases IV and V in the goods market. Most of the evidence on that sub-
ject has been presented above, but a few additional considerations are perti-
nent and warrant discussion.
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION VERSUS EXPORT INDUSTRIES
The growth of exports, both traditional and nontraditional, is more rapid
during Phases IV and V because of reduced bias in the regime and because of
the higher real EER confronting exports. Two related phenomena are worthy
of note: (1) devaluation and its accompanying measures are associated with a
considerable reduction in the pull toward import substitution; and (2) the
variance in domestic resource costs (DRCs) seems lower in Phases IV and V
than in Phases I and II. Bhagwati has already documented the extent of
variance in DRCs and in the effective tariff equivalents of quantitative restric-
tions in Phase II. That the pull toward high-cost industries is substantially
reduced in Phases IV and V was seen in a number of studies. Even though in-
centives to export can still be of varying heights for different industries, the
range of variation among export-oriented firms and import-substitution firms
is nonetheless considerably smaller in a liberalized regime.
The Brazilian experience perhaps best illustrates the mechanisms involv-
ed. The inducements to export in Brazil centered on exempting exports from
excise and other taxes paid on production for the domestic market. Therefore,
the subsidy equivalent of these exemptions increased with the height of the
domestic excise tax. The level of this tax was set for reasons independent of the
efficiency of exporting, so there was sizable variation in export DRCs, which
led to inefficiencies in exporting. Fishlow found a significant relationship bet-
ween the height of DRC and the size of subsidy by sectors. However, he noted:
A second observation partially counters this first. Actualexportsare positively
related to comparative advantage. ..Itdoes not appear that the incentive
system has induced inefficient exports. Accepting the shadow price of foreign ex-
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tional markets as a major benefit of Phases IV and V.33 They were unable,
however, to estimate its separate impact. It will be argued in Chapter 12 that
the performances of South Korea, Brazil, Israel, and Colombia may be ac-
counted for partly by the competition their export biases engendered for
domestic firms.
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change as 20 per cent above its market level, and counting the two labor-intensive
sectors as more efficient than that critical dividing point, 80 per cent of industrial
exports, and 90 per cent of total exports respond to Brazil's comparative advan-
tage. The problem of diversion of resources to inefficient production does not ap-
pear to be serious, therefore.
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It would thus appear that, in the case of export promotion, subsidization does
not go far enough to offset comparative advantage. The inefficiencies
associated with variance in the regime tend therefore to be reduced.35
The first phenomenon—the extent of resource pulls toward import
substitution in Phase II and the magnitude of the export response in Phases IV
and V—is perhaps more surprising. Even in regimes where there was no
serious intention of reducing the bias toward import substitution, devaluation
generated a greater-than-anticipated response. Perhaps most striking is the
Philippines' experience. The authorities had no intention of adversely affec-
ting import-substitution industries and intended to replace QRs with tariffs,
but despite the shift to tariffs the import-substitution industries were injured
to a far greater degree than anticipated.
The Israeli conversion from quantitative restrictions to tariffs appears to
have followed similarlines. Michaely reported that a commission was
established to provide protection for domestic industries to replace QRs;
however, the growth of exports was far greater than had earlier been the case
because the more realistic export EER reduced the bias of the regime. Accom-
panying that, a more rational allocation of resources (reduced variance) and
slower growth of import-substitution industries emerged.36 As in the Philip-
pines the export response to the shift from quantitative controls to price incen-
tives seems to have been greater than can be explained simply on the basis of
the altered real export EER.
The fact that sizable responses to altered exchange rates were achfeved in
countries where extreme export pessimism prevailed further supports the view
that Phase IV and V regimes tend to generate a larger shift in resources toward
exportables and away from import substitutes than can be attributed to the ex-
change rate changes alone; the reduce bias of the regimes must play a major
role. The Turkish devaluation of 1958, for example, was preceded by a period
when the real export EER declined and there was a precipitous drop in export
earnings. Despite the fact that stimulating export growth was not among the
immediate objectives of the government when devaluation was undertaken,
the period following was accompanied by rapid growth of export volumes and
earnings and relatively stagnant performance by import-substitution in-
dustries. Indeed, export pessimism endured in Turkey throughout the 1960s
despite all evidence to the contrary.
Overall, therefore, even in situations where the government's basic objec-
tives are to maintain the bias of the regime, it would appear that the resource262 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
pulls toward import substitution are significantly smaller in Phases IV and V
than in Phase II. A major reason is that the liberalization and premium-
absorption that accompany devaluation inevitably reduce the bias of. the
regime. In part, also, it results from the fact that government officials may be
unaware of the extent of protection generated by quantitative restrictions and,
therefore, cannot rationally use quantitative control instruments for the at-
tainment of their objectives. It may be that the ability to monitor the economy
better under Phase IV and V regimes is one of the benefits resulting from
devaluation and a shift to price incentives, for—in all instances where the in-
tention was to continue promoting import substitution—the resulting Phase
IV regime nonetheless resulted in reduced bias toward import substitution and
a reduction in the variance in incentives among sectors.
SERVICES
It is a well-known theorem that, in a static model of an open economy
under a fixed exchange rate, an increase in the money supply will result in an
increase in the relative price and output of home goods compared to tradable
goods. If home goods consist predominantly .of services, and if economic
growth is taken into account, the proposition can be reformulated to imply
that services will constitute a higher fraction of GNP with currency overvalua-
tion than with an equilibrium exchange rate.
The theorem applies to an open economy and does notnecessarily follow
in an exchange control situation because resources might be pulled out of
home goods and into import-substituting industries under exchange control,
whereas that would not happen with a convertible currency (with a given tariff
structure). Nonetheless it is possible that services output is significantly af-
fected by the existence of quantitative restrictions. The theorem pertaining to
an open economy might still be applicable if, in Phase II, resources were pulled
out of exportable production toward both import-competing and home-goods
industries. In addition, there is another consideration: if services are less
import-intensive than other sectors, import-constrained production levels in
other sectors might release resources that would then find employment in ser-
vices.37
No evidence on this point emerged from the country studies, but it was
possible to obtain estimates of services output as a fraction of GNP.38 Using
those data, services as a fraction of GNP were regressed as a function of time
for each country, with common dummy variables for Phases I and II and for
Phases IV and V. It was hypothesized that, if services as a fraction of GNP do
vary significantly with the phases of the regime, the coefficient for the Phase
I-I! dummy variable should be positive (and significant), and negative for the
Phase IV-V dummy variable. "Forall countries except Chile, Egypt, and In-
dia, there was a slight upward trend in the share of service output in GNP, but
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no particular insights emerge from that. Inclusion of the dummy variables in-
dicated that the service share of GNP was 2.06 percent more in Phases I and II
than on average, although the coefficient was not significant. These results ac-
cord with those of the country studies: there is no evidence of any systematic
tendency for the service sectors to be a more important component of GNP
under QR regimes than under liberalized regimes.
CoMPosITIoN OF INVESTMENT
The same reasoning that suggests that services might be larger in Phase II
can also be used to generate the hypothesis that construction may constitute a
higher fraction of investment in Phase II than in IV and V. In addition there
may be a second reason to expect construction to be relatively more important
in QR regimes: if plant and equipment investment has a higher import content
than does construction, the foreign-exchange constraint limiting imports of
capital goods may restrict the amount of investment in plant and equipment.
Assuming that savings are affected relatively little by the type of trade and
payments regime, loanable funds available to finance construction would be
relatively greater in Phase II compared to Phases IV and V.
A possible offset is that the composition of investment is affected by sec-
toral rates of expansion. Suppose that investment in agriculture, for example,
has a higher construction/machinery ratio than that in manufacturing, and
agriculture expands more rapidly relative to manufacturing in Phases IV and V
than it does in Phases I and II; then, the tendency on the supply side for a
higher construction/machinery ratio in Phases I and II could be partially or
entirely offset by the tendency on the demand side for a higher ratio in Phases
IV and V.
To confound the issue still further, the real price of capital goods imports
typically increases with devaluation. Nonetheless there is a little evidence from
the country studies that tends to support the hypothesis that the supply side
dominates. In Colombia, for example, D(az found that construction was a
more stable component of GNP than was plant and equipment investment.
However, while the ratio of Gross Domestic Capital Formation to GNP rose in
current terms after devaluations, it fell in real terms after the 1957/58 Phase
III episode because of the rise in the relative prices of those capital goods (see
Table 11-1). According to Diaz's analysis, the sharp drop in coffee prices
represented a real deterioration in terms of trade between capital goods (im-
ports) and exports. In the Colombian case, high EERs for nontraditional ex-
ports and for imports thus constituted a tax that enabled a high rate of capital
formation to continue. also notes that the demand for investment goods
was apparently inelastic in that the fraction of investment in GNP rose to ac-
commodate the new, higher real exchange rate. 40
TheTurkish experience also tends to confirm the shift in composition of264 IMPACT OF PHASES IV AND V REGIMES
investment in Phase IV. Construction rose from 69 to 76 percent of total in-
vestment from 1953 to 1957, and investment in machinery and equipment fell
from 31 percent to 24 percent.4' As in Colombia, there was heavy dependence
on capital goods imports for machinery and equipment investment, while con-
struction had a far smaller import content (23 percent for construction versus
87 percent for plant and equipment in 1953). Despite import substitution, this
disparate foreign exchange content existed throughout the period, with the
result that investment in plant and equipment was more severely constrained
by the decline in foreign-exchange earnings than was construction investment.
No evidence on changes in the composition of investment was reported by
the individual country authors for other countries. However, data from the
U.N. Yearbook of International Accounts were employed to testthe
hypothesis that construction investment as a fraction of total investment is
systematically higher in Phase II than in Phases IV and V. The methodology
was the same as that for the service share of GNP. Using the ratio of construc-
tion investment to total investment as a dependent variable for each country,
the independent variables were time and an index of export earnings; a com-
mon coefficient for all countries was estimated for this index. Finally, dummy
variables for Phases I and II and for Phases IV and V were introduced.42
The coefficient for export earnings turned out to be insignificant. Yet the
coefficient on the dummy variable for Phases I and II was 0.179 implying that
construction investment was greater than its average level by 17.9 percent in
Phases I and H. A country with a "normal" 40 percent of fixed capital forma-
tion in construction would under these estimates have 47 percent of fixed in-
vestment in construction in Phases I and II. The coefficient for the dummy
variable for Phases IV and V was The probability that construction
constitutes a higher fraction of investment in Phases I and II is above 90 per-
cent. While there are important differences between countries, there is
nonetheless some support for the notion that the nature of the trade and
payments regime affects the composition of investment.
INVENTORY INVESTMENT
Incentives to hold inventories, especially of imported goods, are greater
under exchange-control regimes than liberalized regimes. Uncertainties and
delays surrounding the issuance of import licenses, the expectation of increas-
ed foreign exchange shortage, and the one-sided probability of exchange rate
alteration all provide incentives to hedge against increased costs or supply
disruptions. Insofar as domestic suppliers may also be dependent on imports,
there may even be incentives for augmenting domestic inventories of goods
competing with imports to guard against supply disruptions.
Thus the hypothesis that a higher fraction of investable resources is
allocated to inventory investment under QR regimes than under liberalized
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desired inventories for any level of output would be Vhigherunder QRs. But
the existence of those same quantitative restrictions implies that desired inven-
tory levels will exceed realized ones because one purpose of the QR regime is to
frustrate speculative inventory behavior. Thus it is quite possible that there
will simultaneously be inventory levels below and above the desired levels, with
the situation varying from commodity to commodity and from firm to firm.
Even for the same firm it is possible that some items might be well below the
stock level that would be held in the absence of QRs, while other items would
be well above this level.
The very fact that both phenomena can occur simultaneously suggests
that, if inventories of imported materials were found to be at the same levels
under restrictive regimes as they were under liberalized regimes, there would be
a presumption that the composition of inventories was nonoptimal in the QR
situation. Of necessity, empirical evidence on this is relatively scanty and—in
light of the fact that the two tendencies are offsetting—difficult to interpret.
Only for Turkey did there appear to be strong evidence that inventory holdings
were considerably above average during the QR Phases, and even there the
evidence was presumptive, based on a comparison of the share of inventory in-
vestment in total investment in various countries.
Thus, it may be that there are departures from optimal inventory holdings
under QRs, which are corrected in liberalized trade regimes. If that is so,
however, those departures are both positive and negative, and it seems dif-
•ficult to draw any inferences about the overall level Of inventory investment
and its behavior with respect to the payments regime. Like so many other
microeconomic effects, if such phenomenon is significant it is reflected in
altered capital/output ratios and growth rates, but the separate influence of in-
ventory holdings, as opposed to other microeconomic phenomena, cannot be
discerned.
IMPORT INTENSITY OF PRODUCTION
•It was already seen that, despite QRs, there is a tendency to substitute
underpriced imported capital goods for domestic labor during Phase II.
Liberalization of the regime generally entails a move toward more realistic
relative factor prices. That same general phenomenon is found in the goods
market; individuals who can get import licenses have more incentive to use
import-intensive techniques in Phase II than they do under a liberalized trade
and payments regime.44 It was already mentioned that Turkish export in-
dustries used far fewer capital goods imports per TL of output than did
import-competing industries, and they were also far less import intensive in
daily operations. A shift in the composition of output toward export produc-
tion was therefore associated with a decrease in import demand.45
For Ghana, Leith estimated an implicit subsidy rate of about 50 percent to
imported inputs. Using Cobb-Douglas production functions he than attemp-266 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
ted to estimate the percentage changes in outputs and imported materials in-
puts that resulted from subsidizing capital goods and intermediate goods im-
ports. He estimated that the output response to subsidies was generally
smaller, and often considerably so, than the input response. For an industry
such as radio and television assembly, the subsidy on inputs generated an out-
put increase only two-thirds as large as the increase in foreign inputs; this im-
plies that domestic value added was reduced as imported raw materials were
substituted for domestic factors.4' In addition the increase in capital employed
was about twice the increase in output.
There is thus something of an apparent anomaly: Phase II regimes, which
are imposed because of perceived foreign exchange "shortages," appear to
result in an upward shift in the demand for imports caused with that under
liberalized trade and payments regimes. As with so many other factors, the QR
regime itself may prevent the satisfaction of this demand, but—to the extent
that such a shift is present—estimates of the actual excess demand at prevailing
prices overstate the excess demand that would prevail in the absence of restric-
tions.
The magnitude of the upward shift in foreign-exchange demand naturally
varies with the precise nature of the trade and payments regime and also with
the extent to which the regime is biased toward import substitution. It is ironic
that a trade and payments regime intended to allocate scarce foreign exchange
apparently results in a more irrational, and less economic, allocation of
foreign exchange than would have existed under a liberalized trade and
payments regime. Even in the absence of an export response to liberalization,
it may well be that the increased rationality with which foreign earnings can be
allocated to competing uses is a considerable benefit to the domestic economy.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
In the first half of the 1970s, some dissatisfaction was voiced with the goal
of rapid economic growth for the developing countries, or at least with growth
as it has so far been experienced. These misgivings have emanated largely from
recognition that growth has not necessarily been fully shared with low-income
groups in the country. It is widely believed that, in some instances, a high
growth rate has even been associated with an absolute worsening of the real in-
comes of the poorest segments of the community.
An important issue, therefore, is the relationship between the choice of
trade and payments regime and the effect on income distribution. The answer
appears to be that the distribution of income is determined by variables other
than the trade and payments regime.
Comparative studies of income distribution and its change over time
across countries have revealed little relationship between trade regimes and the
degree of income inequality. The World Bank classified countries by income
distribution pattern into high-inequality (where the lowest 40 percent of the
population receives
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population receives less than 12 percent of the income) and low-inequality
countries (where the lowest 40 percent gets more than 17 percent of the in-
come). Seven of the ten countries included in the project were covered by the
bank study; data for Ghana, Israel, and Egypt were not available.
Examination of both cross-section and time-series data reveals the same
lack of association. Brazil (1970), Colombia (1970), and the Philippines (1971)
are all classified as high-inequality countries; Chile (1968), India (1964), and
Turkey (1968) in the moderate-inequality group; while South Korea
(1970) is a low-inequality country.47 Evidence on changes in the distribution is
somewhat scarcer, but what little there is does not show any systematic rela-
tionship either. South Korea's income distribution appears to have been in-
creasingly equal, at least since 1966.48 In contrast, India's appears to have
become somewhat more unequal.
Virtually all of the country study authors examined the income distribu-
tion issue and concluded that there is no necessary connection between the
nature of the trade and payments regime and the degree of inequality. Fishlow
did not believe that the change in income distribution accompanying the
Brazilian policy shift in the late 1960s was a necessary concomitant of it. Diaz
reached the same conclusion for Colombia:
In earlier chapters, I argued that Colombian import controls and the protective
system in general do appear to reinforce income inequality, regional disparities,
and industrial concentration. The protective system has also encouraged a large
number of capital-intensive projects. A policy package that eliminates import
controls while encouraging exports could, however, generate new rents even as it
destroys those associated with import substitution. Furthermore, the elimination
of import controls would still leave a multitude of similar mechanisms through
which the rich and powerful could take advantage of state power to buttress and
further their position... Thus,focusing just on the protective system can give a
misleading impression of the true sources of inequality, confusing a symptom for
the cause of the disease....Itis debatable whether the economic and political
power such [privileged] minorities may lose from the abolition of import controls
is greater than the power gains that would accrue to, say, cattle, cotton, and sugar
landowners from their expanding exports.
.
Baldwin,likewise, appears to attribute the income-distribution effects of
the Philippine trade and payments regime to specific policies adopted in pur-
suit of the import-substitution strategy, rather than to the nature of the regime
itself. In Turkey the trade and payments regime affected income distribution
among specific groups. For example, after devaluation, farmers in the regions
growing export crops benefited as their incomes expanded, but they lost out
during Phase II; incomes of those in regions where production was for
domestic consumption reacted in the opposite direction. Within the Turkish
industrial sector the major redistributional implications of the trade and268 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
payments regime centered on importers relative to industrialists. The traders
whose business was to import and resell consumer goods lost out to the in-
dustrialists who started factories to take advantage of import prohibitions.
What often happened, of course, was that the importers themselves began to
undertake manufacturing activities as the potential profits from direct impor-
tation of finished goods dwindled. 50
Ina number of studies, concern over the real incomes of growers of staple
exports was a major factor in exchange rate policy. The severance of the staple
export commodities from the world price via export taxes was politically dif-
ficult, if not impossible. In some countries, such as Brazil and Colombia, plan-
tation agriculture was involved, so that maintaining the real exchange rate
favored the large landowners and allowing it to appreciate was egalitarian, at
least within agriculture. In other countries, such as Ghana and Turkey, export
crops were generally grown on much smaller landholdings, and devaluation
probably reduced inequality.
Restrictive trade and payments regimes persisted in part because of con-
cern over the windfall gains that would result from increasing the real export
rate. In part the reluctance to devalue resulted from confusion between the
short-run impact of devaluation and its longer-run effect. It is important to
distinguish between the impact of exchange rate changes during the time the
economy is adjusting to altered incentives and the effects of a sustained transi-
tion to a liberalized regime. In the short run there may be windfall gains
(although they can be taxed away when the political will is present, as happened
in Turkey), and these do seem to accrue in the way theory would predict: in
most countries, export industries have benefited from the devaluation. In the
long run, resources move into the industries whose profitability has improved,
and the quasi-rents disappear. In practice, as Diáz pointed out, no necessary
connection between income distribution and the trade regime exists in the long
run.
Overall it would appear that the choice of trade strategy instruments
should be assigned to the targets of economic growth and resource allocation,
while other instruments should be used to accomplish income distribution ob-
jectives. There is no clear-cut evidence that import substitution improves in-
come distribution, but there is a great deal of evidence that QR regimes, like
export-oriented regimes, can be administered in conformity with distributional
objectives. Generally, however, a higher growth rate provides additional
resources with which income distribution objectives, whatever they are, can be
achieved.
II. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
Most of the microeconomic effects of moving from Phase II to Phase IV or V
appear to have been present in several of the countries covered by the project,
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and some, such as the tendency to shift away from capital-intensive methods
or lines of production, appear to have been close to universal. In some in-
stances the quantitative importance of one factor could not be estimated
separately from other interacting effects of quantitative restrictions; in other
instances it appeared that the impact of one factor might be sizable.
In the last analysis the microeconomic evidence suggests that there are
benefits to be had from liberalization, but it does not provide a feel for the im-
pact of liberalization on economic growth. It proved impossible to quantify
the impact of the regime on certain aspects of the economy—the degree of
competition, for example—though there could be no doubt that such an effect
was present. Other aspects, such as the extent of substitution of capital for
labor, could be estimated, but those estimates are not helpful in judging the
overall impact of an inappropriate capital/labor ratio on economic growth.
Growth Effects in Individual Countries
In a number of instances the Phase III episode was so quickly followed by
resumption of Phase II, or by other intervening and dominant events, that no
inferences about the overall impact on growth can be drawn. Those include the
first two Brazilian devaluations, the Colombian devaluations prior to 1967,
Egypt's almost-zero net devaluation, India's devaluation with the crop failure
following it, and South Korea's 1961 devaluation. Growth effects in some of
the other situations—Brazil's 1964-1968 Phase III and its aftermath, Colom-
bia's experience after 1967, Israel's growth since 1955, and South Korea's after
1964—were at least as much the result of the long-run alterations in the bias of
the regime as of the shorter-term change in real export EERs and liberaliza-
tion; these will be examined in Chapter 12. That leaves Chile, Ghana, the
Philippines, and Turkey, where transition to Phases IV and V lasted long
enough for some inferences to be drawn about growth but the bias of the
regime remained heavily oriented toward import substitution.
Can.E
The evidence for Chile is very mixed, but the one conclusion that emerges
is that there is no support for the view that periods of restriction led to higher
growth, as some Chilean observers have claimed. Behrman points out that the
1956-1958 period, which was when the Klein-Saks liberalization program was
in force, had the highest rate of growth of any period between World War II
and Behrman also examined the relationship, often assumed to
exist, between Chile's growth rate and the change in her terms of trade; again
he found no evidence to support an association. Overall, Behrman believes
that all three Chilean episodes were inaugurated with the currency still over-270 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
valued and that, under those circumstances, the ensuing inflation left little
hope of any positive and lasting effect from devaluation.
GHANA
Ghana's economic growth rate was exceptionally low throughout the
1960s. Leith believes that there is "a variety of evidence which links Ghana's
control regime and its economic atrophy in the 1960's."
During this period both the savings rate and the productivity of investment
declined significantly. The control regime was an important contributor to this
poor performance.
It is important, however, not to overdraw the negative contribution of the
control regime. The case against controls is largely that controls permitted errors
in policy to have adverse effects on economic growth. Elimination of the set of
trade and exchange controls employed for most of the 1960's could thus be ex-
pected to alleviate adverse growth effects only indirectly and with a long
lag..
Hetherefore attributed the failure of the devaluation and ensuing liberaliza-
tion largely to the government's unwillingness to take other policy measures
that could have resulted both in a sustained Phase IV or V regime and in better
growth performance.
THE PHILIPPINES
As already seen, the Philippines enjoyed very rapid growth in the early
1950s, but later the growth rate decelerated. Baldwin pointed to the rising
capital/labor ratio, constraints on imports due to lack of adequate foreign ex-
change growth, and other factors associated with the continuing bias of the
regime, as the basic sources of the difficulty:
A more selective use of import-substituting and export-promoting policies might
have resulted in faster growth in the past and almost certainly would set the basis
for a higher development rate in the future than the inward-looking policy of im-
port substitution. .. ."
TURKEY
The detrimental effects of cutbacks in imports went so far prior to the
Turkish devaluation of 1958 that the rate of growth fell sharply. The reforms
in the trade and payments regime instituted in the last 1950s accelerated the
rate of economic growth. While the rate was much higher in the late 1960s than
in the mid-1950s, devaluation and liberalization in 1970 once again triggered a
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Turkey, therefore, the increase in export earnings and other factors associated
with the devaluation enabled the growth rate to improve for two reasons:
(1) the detrimental effects on the economy of import shortages and controls
were partially removed, and (2) increased export production itself contributed
somewhat to a higher growth rate.
Pooling Experience across Countries
It is of interest, in view of all the particular circumstances that surround each
change in phases, to examine common tendencies that can be seen from pool-
ingallthe data. One means of attempting to estimate the potential
macroeconomic contribution of successful transition to Phase IV is to estimate
statistically whether overall growth rates differ significantly with the rate of
export growth or with the phase of the trade and payments regime.
For that purpose, all Phase IV and V regimes were compared with all
Phase I and II regimes covered by the country studies. No distinction was
made between a Chilean Phase IV—in which sustained resource reallocation
was discouraged by the expectation that the real exchange rate would quickly
appreciate—and a sustained Phase IV—such as Israel's experienced after
1962. Likewise, no attempt was made to distinguish between degrees of ex-
change control in Phase II, so that the Israeli Phase II of 1960 is treated as be-
ing of the same genre as the Indian Phase II of 1957-1965. In Chapter 12 the
differences between sustained export-oriented regimes and intermittent moves
to Phase IV within the context of a persistent bias toward import substitution
are discussed, but that distinction is not made here.
Equation (11.1) below was used to estimate the contribution of exports to
economic growth and to rest for differences in growth rates between the
phases. The regression was fitted from time series data for each country:
log =a0,++ c(logX1) + + (11.1)
where GNP, is the constant-price estimate of GNP; t =time; =anindex
of the dollar value of exports of country i relative to i's average exports over
the entire period. =1in Phases I and II and zero otherwise, while =1
in Phases IV and V and zero otherwise. The estimates are given in Table 11-2.
Several comments about the form of the regression are in order. First, the
level of exports responds to changes in the real exchange rate, and thus is
presumably higher in Phases IV and V than in I and II. Therefore, any
significance attaching to the export variable, and to differences between the
dummies, can be interpreted as resulting partially from the trade and payments
regime. Insofar as the estimates are reliable, the inclusion of exports provides272 IMPACT OF PHASE IV AND V REGIMES
one means of separating Phase IV or V GNP increases into two com-
ponents—that attributable to improved export performance and that resulting
from other growth effects of liberalized regimes. Thus the coefficients of the
phase dummies can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of all the
elements—in both the commodity and the factor markets—that were con-
sidered in the first section of this chapter; the coefficients of the export
variable can be interpreted as the contribution of an additional unit of exports
to GNP growth.
It should be noted that the time coefficient was estimated separately for
each country, while there is one coefficient for exports over all countries. The
reason for estimating separate time coefficients was that each country's struc-
ture obviously has a strong impact on its growth rate, but data (and techni-
ques) are unavailable for satisfactory estimation of a growth model for each
country; time was used as a proxy for all structural and other factors affecting
the growth rate. Once separate factors are taken into account for each country
individually, the average contribution of export growth to the growth rate for
all countries may be ascertained.
The multiplication of the phase dummies by the time variable implies that
the coefficients of the dummies will indicate the average change in the growth
rateassociatedwith different phases.54 For example, a coefficient of 1 on the
dummy variable D2impliesthat the growth rate of any given country during
Phases IV and V exceeds its time-determined rate by 1 percentage point per an-
num; for example, a country predicted to grow at an average annual rate of 3
percent would be expected to grow at a rate of 4 percent during Phases IV and
V.
Given all the factors that influence growth rates, it is hardly to be ex-
pected that as crude a specification of underlying determinants of growth rates
as a time variable will yield entirely satisfactory results. Indeed, the coeffi-
cients of both the dummy variables and the export variable are probably bias-
ed downward because: (1) to the extent that liberalization progresses over time
and results in higher growth, part of the impact of the liberalization may be
reflected in the coefficient of the time variable; and (2) to the extent that the
average rate of growth of the economy is a function of the restrictiveness of
the regime, differences in growth rates among countries are in part the result
of differences in the regime. Thus, South Korea's and Brazil's higher growth
rates are almost certainly at least partly functions of their Phase IV regimes,
whereas India's and Ghana's lower rates are partially the result of their QR
regimes. That effect is missed in this estimation procedure, as differences in
average rates among countries are taken as resulting from factors other than
the nature of the trade and payments regime.
The effort here, however, was to estimate the effect of a move to Phases
IV and V, with or without a commitment to a long-term sustained change in
bias. Most of the differences in growth rates resulting from different trade and
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payments regimes are probably a function of those longer-term variables
rather than the shorter-term changes in phases under investigation here;
therefore the downward bias in the estimates is probably not very great. The
results of the estimation procedure are given in Table 11-2. The period covered
was 1954 to 1971, except that shorter periods were used for Ghana and India
• due to lack of data.
The coefficients of the time variable and those of the dummy variables
reflect the percentage growth per annum associated with the pure time variable
and with the phases of the regime. For convenience the average annual growth
rate for each country over the interval is included in the first column following
• the country name. The second column gives the time variable coefficient when
the export variable and phase dummies are included. In South Korea, for ex-
ample, the average rate of growth over the period 1954 to 1971 was 6.69 per-
cent per annum. However, the coefficient of the time variable drops to 3.63
percent when export earnings and dummy variables are introduced; a great
deal of the growth performance can be explained by the rapid growth of export
earnings in the 1960s and the fact that South Korea was in Phases IV and V.
The most interesting estimates are the coefficients for the exports and the
phase dummy variables. The coefficient of the export variable is positive and
significant at the 99 percent level. It implies that an increase in the rate of
growth of exports of 1 percent will increase the rate of growth of GNP by just
Table11.2.ImpactofExport Growth and. Trade Regime upon GNP Growth
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over 0.1 percent. Thus, when export earnings increased in Phase IV or for
other reasons, growth was on average faster. For South Korea, for example,
the 40 percelfl average annual rate of growth of exports during the late 1960s
would, according to this estimate, have accounted for 4 percent faster growth
in real GNP compared to the period of stagnant export earnings in the 1950s.
The dummy variables are not significant, and their magnitude is in any
event very small when it is recalled that the dummies assume values of 1 and
zero. The difference between them is negligible and not significant, also. This
suggests that factors associated with better export performance explain
whatever systematic differences there are in growth rates under different
phases of the regime; the fact that the regime itself is liberalized (or restricted)
does not seem to have any additional independent influence. It may be, of
course, that the statistical estimation procedure is too crude to pick up the
separate influence of liberalization relative to that of QRs on growth.
Nonetheless the results accord with impressions from a priori reasoning and
with the evidence presented earlier in this chapter: altering the exchange rate
reduces the bias of the regime somewhat and therefore results in some im-
provement in export earnings.55 That in itself leads to a more satisfactory rate
of growth of GNP than would otherwise occur. Beyond that achievement,
however, regimes oriented toward import-substitution could hardly be ex-
pected to experience significant improvement in their growth rates simply by•
virtue of altering the exchange rate, especially when expectations are either
uncertain or for reversion to Phase II.
This is not to say that devaluation is unimportant. After all, the conse-
quences of the drop in export earnings in Turkey in the mid-1950s and the
relative stagnation of Ghana's and India's exports probably do account for a
significant fraction of their poor performance during those periods. In that
sense raising the real export LER may be a necessary condition for maintaining
a satisfactory rate of growth and for preventing it from plummeting as a con-
sequence of the "foreign exchange gap" and other aspects of QR regimes.
The chief benefit that can be expected from devaluation (and consequent
reduction of bias) in a regime oriented toward import-substitution arises from
the more satisfactory export performance associated with a realistic exchange
rate. As was seen in Chapter 9, such an increase in export earnings can be
sizable, although itis not likely to be sufficient to produce above-average
growth in the export sector in the long run. To accomplish that requires a
reversal of signals in the entire gamut of policy instruments, and the experience
of countries trying that is subject of Chapter 12.
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